[FT]製品の競争力低下こそが日本の問題
金融政策を巡り日銀と安倍晋三新政権との駆け引きが続いている。
日銀はついに政権からの圧力に屈し、2%の物価目標を導入したが、達成期限については「できるだけ早期に」との表現にとどめた。無制限の金融緩和も打ち出したが、導入は2014年となる。それでも、円売り・株買いの動きは根強い。果たして安倍政権に勝算があるのかという点ではなく、円安・株高基調がある程度続くとみている点で、市場は楽観的すぎる可能性がある。
安倍首相と日本の産業界は円高、さらに正確にはウォン安が主な問題だと捉えている。これはもはや事実ではない。円安が大幅に進んだとしても、世界の消費者はサムスン製の機器からソニーや東芝製に乗り換えようとはしないだろう。問題は通貨ではなく、製品の競争力低下にあるのだ。
安倍政権が打ち出した財政刺激策は確かに大規模だが、歴代政権と同様に民間投資や消費を刺激する大きな効果は望めない。
円相場は既に15%下落したため、修正が進みすぎたとの意見が大半だ。それでもなお、一段の円安に向け、日銀は近いうちに大規模な外債購入に踏み切らざるを得ないとの声もある。
これが現実になれば、事態は大幅に悪化しかねない。過度の円安に陥る危険が高まり、日本の国債市場と経済に負の連鎖が及ぶ。市場は現時点ではさらに大量の国債が供給され、円安が進む脅威を認識していない。
もっとも、今のところは楽観的な見方が優勢だ。そうした見方は4月に日銀の白川方明総裁が退任すれば一段と強まるだろう。主な後任候補は軒並み安倍首相に近い立場をとっているからだ。
だが、安倍首相の政策が誤りだったことが判明し、円安と国債利回り上昇の悪循環に陥れば、新総裁は白川総裁の比ではない悪夢のシナリオに直面する可能性がある。(1日付)
=英フィナンシャル・タイムズ特約
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元記事は以下
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/16e16bc4-6b97-11e2-a700-00144feab49a.html#ixzz2JiFmp43S
Japan’s
problem is uncompetitive products
The market may be too optimistic on short
yen/long equities trade
The tug of war between the Bank of Japan and the
newly installed government led by Shinzo Abe continues.
The central bank
finally yielded to pressure from the administration to voice its commitment to a
new 2 per cent target for inflation but did not commit to any deadline beyond
“the medium term”. It promised more open-ended easing but that will start only
in 2014. The net increase in asset purchases for next year will be a mere Y4tn a
month.
Despite the bank’s rearguard action, faith in the short yen/long
equities trade remains widespread. But the market may be too optimistic ? not in
believing that the Abe administration will prevail but in believing that the
trade will work for any sustained period.
Mr Abe and the business community
in Japan continue to think their main problem is an expensive yen, or more
accurately an underpriced Korean won. That may have been true in the past but
not today. Even if the yen was to fall significantly, the world’s consumers are
not about to abandon Samsung gadgets for those of Sony or Toshiba. The problem
is not an uncompetitive currency, it is uncompetitive products.
The latest
fiscal stimulus programme is large. Indeed, the Y20tn headline figure is the
largest since the second world war, according to JPMorgan. But it, like its
predecessors, is unlikely to have a big multiplier effect in stimulating more
private investment or consumption.
Meanwhile, Japan’s trade deficits will
worsen as the cost of imports rises while the current account will benefit but
not enough to compensate. The fiscal deficit is expected to reach a shocking
11.5 per cent this year, JPMorgan estimates.
The yen has already depreciated
15 per cent, leading many to believe the correction is now overdone. Still, some
analysts expect the Bank of Japan will soon be forced to embark on a massive
programme of foreign bond purchases in an effort to drive the currency even
further down, spending a possible Y50tn in the process. It is not entirely clear
whether that buying will be targeted exclusively at eurozone debt or US
Treasuries as well (as some Fed officials believe may be the case).
If that
happens, there may be much worse to come. One reason the yen has remained strong
(until recently) is because the BoJ has been much less aggressive in expanding
its balance sheet than other central banks. As that changes, the danger that the
yen overshoots on the downside becomes higher, with big negative ripple effects
both on the Japanese government bond market and the Japanese economy.
The
markets today remain oblivious to the threat of massive new supplies of
government bonds and developments in the currency market. But foreign investors
now hold 9 per cent of the bond market. As the yen goes down, those investors
will begin to demand more yield to compensate for their losses on a depreciating
yen. What happens then?
One possible scenario is that the Japanese money,
which went into Europe and the US in an effort to drive down the yen, decides to
come home to shore up the government debt market. No Japanese investor can
afford to take capital losses on their holdings of JGBs and the government can
hardly risk paying more to service its spiralling debt.
Moreover, the
currency could fall much more, given how many hedge funds are betting against
it. Many, including David Einhorn at Greenlight Capital, finally made money on
their short yen positions in the last quarter of the year. (Indeed, the position
was Mr Einhorn’s second most lucrative one for the period.) They will be tempted
to add to their positions, especially since the cost of borrowing yen is so
cheap.
“The yen has finally begun to weaken. We suspect that there is more to
come ? possibly a lot more to come. We continue to be bearish,” Mr Einhorn wrote
in a letter to investors dated January 22.
Still, for now, optimism prevails.
The yield on the 10-year JGB hit a low of 69 basis points in December and is now
a mere 74bp. The general optimism will be reinforced come April when Masaaki
Shirakawa is replaced at the helm of the Bank of Japan. All the leading
candidates for the position are more supportive of Mr Abe than they are of the
current governor.
Still, if Mr Abe is wrong and precipitates a vicious cycle
of a weakening yen and rising government bond yields rather than an economic
revival, Mr Shirakawa’s successor could face even more of a nightmare scenario
than the incumbent has done during his contentious
tenure.
henny.sender@ft.com